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When It Hurts to Ask: Avoiding Moral Injury in Requests to Forgo Treatment
Abstract
Clinicians commonly believe that "there is no harm in asking" patients with life-threatening illnesses if
they would like to forgo aggressive therapy. In fact, many clinicians believe that the question is not only
appropriate, but obligatory on grounds of patient empowerment and autonomy: Patients should be given
all options, including the option to stop treatment. But in this piece, I argue that there is, indeed, serious -and even traumatic -- harm in asking patients to forgo treatment if that request is perceived by the patient
as evidence that the clinician devalues or questions the integrity of that patient's life. When such requests
are perceived to imply: "Your life is not worth saving," the effect of the "ask" is insult and offense, not
empowerment. I then argue how clinicians can avoid moral injury in conversations about withholding or
withdrawing treatment.
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When It Hurts to Ask: Avoiding Moral Injury in Requests to Forgo Treatment
Abstract

Clinicians commonly believe that "there is no harm in asking" patients with life-threatening
illnesses if they would like to forgo aggressive therapy. In fact, many clinicians believe that the
question is not only appropriate, but obligatory on grounds of patient empowerment and
autonomy: Patients should be given all options, including the option to stop treatment. But in
this piece, I argue that there is, indeed, serious -- and even traumatic -- harm in asking patients to
forgo treatment if that request is perceived by the patient as evidence that the clinician devalues
or questions the integrity of that patient's life. When such requests are perceived to imply: "Your
life is not worth saving," the effect of the "ask" is insult and offense, not empowerment. I then
argue how clinicians can avoid moral injury in conversations about withholding or withdrawing
treatment.
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When It Hurts to Ask: Avoiding Moral Injury in Requests to Forgo Treatment
Case
Mr. Jones is a 55-year-old paraplegic who became paralyzed several decades ago in an
accident. He is now suffering from an infected Stage 4 wound and has recently had it
debrided. He is facing a long treatment course with poor odds of recovery. His treating
physician broaches the subject of palliative care and the withholding of aggressive
therapy.
Comment
In a telling recent testimonial(1), disabled cultural anthropologist William J. Peace
describes the experience of being asked to consider forgoing life-sustaining treatment for a
seriously infected wound that, while medically treatable, would entail a long, arduous recovery.
In his retrospective, Peace relays how his physician reviewed, in excruciating detail, the difficult
road he would face to recovery. The clinician then offered Peace the option to simply forgo all
life-prolonging measures and choose the alternative of comfort care.
What might have seemed to the physician an obligatory conversation to disclose the full
range of treatment options was experienced by Peace as an emotional and ethical injury—one
that he terms the “denial of personhood.” Peace writes as someone genuinely traumatized,
saying that he is “haunted” by this “unforgettable” conversation; that it “gnaws” at him “to this
day;” and that he is still “paralyzed…with fear.” His critique of the physician is a moral one
because Peace feels wronged and “discriminated against.” How did a clinical discussion
considered commonplace (and even compulsory) have this devastating effect on its recipient and
provoke such moral reproach?
In most cases, the ostensible motivation for suggesting the withholding of life-sustaining
treatment is to bolster patient empowerment, thereby allowing the patient to make a truly
informed decision about the course of treatment. If an appreciation of all options is a
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prerequisite for exercising the right to choose among them, such conversations tend to be
perceived as a beneficent means of facilitating patient autonomy. Thus, a typical context for
raising the issue of withholding life-sustaining therapy would be end-stage illness, when patients
might be grateful to know that they have the clinical option to stop aggressive therapy—i.e., the
“permission” to put the option of hospice or comfort care on the table. Peace’s physician was
clearly tapping into this common rationale, as Peace was empathically told, “The choice to
receive antibiotics was mine and mine alone.”
Then what went wrong? The conventional view of conversations about withholding or
withdrawing treatment is that they do no harm as long as the patient is not coerced into
agreement or assent. The rationale in the adage “There’s no harm in asking” is that the person
asked can always say “No.” But this logic naively assumes that the question itself carries no
moral cost. With coercion identified as the only moral liability in discussions of withholding
treatment, Peace’s emotional and moral reactions seem to have no traction: after all, he could and
did say “no,” therefore he couldn’t have been coerced. But this analysis of “asking” is too
simple: What we inquire of others reveals a great deal about our perceptions, assumptions, and
estimations of them—and therein lies the source of Peace’s feelings of distress and offense when
asked if he wanted to stop curative therapy.
In order for the physician to raise the specter of comfort care in Peace’s case, he had to
believe that death was a legitimate (and arguably preferable) option to living with this illness,
this level of prolonged suffering, and this long trajectory to meaningful recovery. The request
had embedded in it a judgement that suggests, all things considered, that Peace’s life might not
be worth the fight it would take to save it. This makes Peace’s case very different from
withholding conversations that take place in the context of end-stage illness. In those cases,
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there is no recovery or medically possible cure; and therefore no value judgement that the benefit
of survival is outweighed by the costs of securing it. Peace was the recipient of an unfavorable
verdict about the worth of his life. He was deemed by the physician as having what we might
call a value-negative life: an existence that, on balance, entails far more pain and suffering than
any amount of good that can come from continuing it. Peace’s testimonial supports this
interpretation. He writes of the physician’s mindset: “Clearly death was preferable to nursing
home care, unemployment, bankruptcy, and a life-time in bed.”
To be judged by someone as having a value-negative life is to be assaulted in two
substantially different ways. First, it is an insult to the integrity of that life, tantamount to saying,
“Your life isn’t worth the price of your _____ (physical pain, financial expense, emotional
suffering, compromised level of activity).” It is the presumptuous assessment of an outsider
whose vantage point is inherently blinded to all that makes life good and worthwhile from the
insider’s view, to the possessor of that life. It is a dismissal of the reasons his life has value for
him and for the people who love him. It is this insult that explains Peace’s feelings of
indignation, resentment, and affront.
But there is a second level of assault in being deemed to have a value-negative life; and it
explains Peace’s fear. Such a calculation carries a menacing threat, namely: “Your life isn’t
worth my _____ (trouble, effort, expense, sympathy, anguish).” Asking a patient to forgo lifesustaining therapy in such situations implies that the patient is a bother, a nuisance, a waste of
time, or a squandering of clinical resources. Moreover, it raises the specter of an ominous pricetag being placed on one’s life and one’s continued care. But what follows when one’s life isn’t
valued, when someone’s death seems a better alternative to his existence? Third-person
estimations of value-negative lives have wrought many destructive, even violent, consequences
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to their recipients. Fear is the natural response to having to justify one’s existence to someone
else: one must offer compelling enough reasons to safeguard one’s life from those who deem it
to have little value.
The burden of having to defend one’s life to one’s physician is the source of Peace’s
claim of discrimination: He is being asked to defend his existence when others are not.
Wheelchair-bound for 25 years, Peace argues that the root of such discrimination is a bias against
the physically disabled—which he calls “disablism,” borrowing a term from the disability studies
literature.(2) But being deemed as having a value-negative life affects a much broader group of
patients, not just the disabled, though he may well be correct that the disabled can categorically
claim to be societally de-valued. Patients with chronic, intractable illnesses; those who are bedbound, comatose, or in unremitting pain; and patients with severe mental illness or cognitive
impairment are equally vulnerable to this same, unfair assessment.
So how can the well-intentioned physician promote the patient empowerment that comes
from having medical choices – including forgoing treatment – while avoiding the harm
sometimes done by the very suggestion of that choice? Perhaps the criterion for requests to
forgo treatment in conscious, competent patients should mirror the one employed for
unconscious, incompetent patients: Is the patient’s condition terminal? Surrogate decisionmakers are only asked to consider withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment when
their loved one’s illness is end-stage or terminal. The rationale for this criterion is that lifesustaining measures in terminal patients are best understood as death-prolonging, rather than lifeenhancing. The surrogate decision-maker is not being asked to render a verdict on the value of
the patient’s life, but on the quality of the patient’s death. Requests to forgo treatment laid bare
are really conversations about how best to die. But in non-terminal patients, talk of a “good
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death” can easily be viewed – as Peace’s story relays – insulting and threatening at worst. Could
a helpful “rule of thumb” be that, with terminally ill patients, physicians can broach the subject
of withholding care that should be patient-initiated in the non-terminally ill?
The immediate objection will be that some non-terminally ill patients very much
welcome the “permission” to back off on aggressive therapies that may be costing them an
inordinate amount of suffering. The argument goes that, if withholding conversations are
withheld from the non-terminally ill, those patients who really want to stop but can’t bring
themselves to, in the absence of their physician’s support, will not be able to raise the possibility
on their own. But this objection can be easily met: non-terminally patients can make a request to
withhold aggressive therapy without literally requesting it. They can allude to the burden of the
therapies, speak about not being able to endure them any longer, express despair or frustration at
the prospect of adding new therapies to their regimen. Any of those signs would count as a
patient-initiated conversation of withholding – without the emotional liabilities experienced by
Peace.
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